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INTRODUCTION 
 
Police escort Jane to the emergency room and report that she shows signs 
of mania and suicidal ideation.  The hospital admits her for emergency care 
at 7:40 p.m.  Four hours later, at around 11:30 p.m., a doctor determines that 
Jane is a danger to herself.  The doctor recommends immediate, involuntary 
commitment at the state psychiatric hospital. 
Jane prepares for her transfer, but a nurse tells her she cannot leave yet.  
The psychiatric hospital reports that no beds are available, and no other 
psychiatric facilities in the state have openings. 
Jane waits through the night, barely sleeping because of the bright lights 
and noises all around her.  She receives minimal care from the well-meaning 
nurses and doctors, who do their best to stabilize her condition but must also 
tend to numerous other patients with pressing needs.  Jane’s condition 
worsens, and she becomes increasingly agitated. 
Five days pass.  Jane becomes frustrated and lashes out, overwhelmed 
with anxiety.  Security staff and paramedics are called fourteen times to 
restrain her.  The hospital spends $26,000 on personnel for Jane’s 130 hours 
of care. 
Finally, a bed opens up at the state psychiatric hospital, and Jane is 
transported there for specialized treatment.  Her involuntary commitment has 
begun.1 
New Hampshire law provides for the involuntary commitment of a 
patient such as Jane when she is a danger to herself or others as a result of 
mental illness.2  The patient has a right to treatment under N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 135-C:1, et seq.3  Specifically, the patient should receive “adequate 
and humane treatment” pursuant to an “individual service plan” and “in the 
least restrictive environment necessary.”4  However, appropriate facilities 
often are not available for patients waiting in emergency rooms,5 and patients 
                                                
1 Based on a true story of a patient in New Hampshire.  See Shawn V. LaFrance & Daniel J. 
Walsh, HELP: People Seeking Mental Health Care in New Hampshire 8, FOUND. FOR 
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.healthynh.com/images/PDFfiles/publications/a%20HELP%20Rpt%20FINAL%20
02%2022%20%2013.pdf.  
2 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27, 34 (2014). 
3 See id. §§ 135-C:1, et seq. 
4 Id. §§ 135-C:13, 135-C:57. 
5 See, e.g., Casey McDermott, Panelists Discuss Mental Health In New Hampshire, CONCORD 
MONITOR (Sep. 24, 2014), http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/13687361-95/panelists-
discuss-mental-health-in-new-hampshire (reporting on remarks by an emergency room doctor 
that patients are “left waiting days at the hospital before they can get to treatment elsewhere”); 
Sarah Palermo, Mentally Ill Patients Face Spartan Conditions, Long Delays In New 
Hampshire, CONCORD MONITOR (Mar. 10, 2013), 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/4741184-95/hospital-state-mental-pod; Sarah Palermo, 
 




can become trapped for hours or even days.6  This phenomenon is called 
“psychiatric boarding.”7 
New Hampshire is not alone in providing a statutory right to treatment, 
and the problem of psychiatric boarding is common in other states.8  While 
enforcement of statutory rights to treatment often is elusive,9 the Washington 
Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling on psychiatric boarding in 
August 2014, finding that it violated the state laws protecting involuntarily 
committed patients.10 
Could the Washington court’s rationale lead to similar conclusions in 
other states?  Looking to New Hampshire as an example, the state statutes for 
commitment and treatment rights are analogous to Washington’s,11 and this 
suggests that the Washington ruling could prove a valuable precedent for 
barring psychiatric boarding in other states. 
This Note will compare Washington’s involuntary commitment law to 
New Hampshire’s, argue that psychiatric boarding is illegal under New 
Hampshire law, and propose solutions for complying with the statute, 
including the continued implementation of community-based services.  If 
                                                                                                               
Record Number Of People Waited Last Week In NH Emergency Departments For Mental 
Health Services, CONCORD MONITOR (Aug. 25, 2013), 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/news/8188121-95/record-number-of-people-waited-last-
week-in-nh-emergency-departments-for-mental-health (reporting that forty-seven people 
suffering from mental health crises waited for beds at the State Hospital on one night). 
6 McDermott, supra note 5. 
7 David Bender et al., A Literature Review: Psychiatric Boarding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 29, 2008), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2008/psybdlr.htm (defining 
“boarding” as “the practice in which admitted patients are held in hallways or other emergency 
department (ED) areas until inpatient beds become available”). 
8 See Bender, supra note 7 (noting that in 2008, eighty percent of emergency department 
medical directors reported that boarding occurred in their facilities); JOHN PARRY, CIVIL 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY 509 (2010) (writing that “[m]ost states 
have provisions in their laws guaranteeing an array of rights to those committed to facilities,” 
and these commonly include “a right to treatment or habilitation”). 
9 See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 3A-3.1 (LEXIS Law Publ’g, 2d ed. 
1998) (discussing the right to treatment and asking if “such a broad order [can] ever, 
realistically, be implemented?”).  
10 Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 332 P.3d 423, 428 (Wash. 2014). 
11 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (“Persons receiving mental health services shall 
have the right to . . . [a]n individual service plan [and] . . . [t]reatment in the least restrictive 
environment necessary to achieve the purposes of the treatment.”) with WASH. REV. CODE § 
71.05.360(2) (“Each person involuntarily detained or committed pursuant to this chapter shall 
have the right to adequate care and individualized treatment.”). 
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New Hampshire implemented its statutory scheme as written, it would satisfy 
patients’ rights to treatment.  
 
I. INVOLUNTARY EMERGENCY ADMISSIONS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
Forty-seven states, including New Hampshire, have statutory provisions 
for emergency involuntary commitment of individuals exhibiting 
dangerousness as a result of mental illness.12  In New Hampshire, a petitioner 
for involuntary commitment must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the individual poses a potentially serious likelihood of danger to self or 
others.13  The petitioner must point to specific acts, such as a drug 
overdose,14 physical attacks on family members,15 or a credible threat to kill 
one’s spouse.16 
Involuntary commitment denies a person the individual liberty and 
autonomy at the core of the American political tradition, and it therefore 
requires significant procedural safeguards.17  The Supreme Court stated in 
Addington v. Texas that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”18  
New Hampshire law reflects this constitutional concern and sets forth a 
detailed procedure for involuntary commitment.19 
 
A. The Legal Basis for Involuntary Commitment 
 
1. New Hampshire Statutes Providing for Involuntary 
Commitment 
 
                                                
12 PARRY, supra note 8 at 471; 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 2A-1 
(LEXIS Law Publ’g, 2d ed. 1998). 
13 In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1198 (N.H. 2006). 
14 Id. at 262 (stating that respondent’s overdose “was undoubtedly a specific act that had the 
potential to cause her serious bodily injury”). 
15 State v. Lavoie, 924 A.2d 370, 373 (N.H. 2007) (finding dangerousness where the defendant 
spat in his mother’s face, tried to strangle her, and physically fought his father). 
16 See In re O'Neil, 992 A.2d 672, 675 (N.H. 2010) (describing dangerous behavior where the 
respondent suggested to his insurance agent that he would violate a protective order keeping 
him from his wife and that “someone [might end] up hurt or dead”). 
17 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE 
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 201–02; BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 17 (2005). 
18 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. 
19 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27–33; see In re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 576 (N.H. 2001) 
(analyzing the “significant statutory safeguards” that “exist to minimize the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of liberty due to civil commitment”); Opinion of the Justices, 122 N.H. 199, 204 
(1982) (interpreting the New Hampshire Constitution as requiring stricter due process 
standards than the federal minimum for purposes of involuntary commitment). 




New Hampshire law provides that a person is “eligible for involuntary 
emergency admission if he is in such mental condition as a result of mental 
illness to pose a likelihood of danger to himself or others.”20  This basic 
standard—danger to self or others as a result of mental illness—parallels 
most other state statutes providing for civil commitment.21  It derives from 
the state’s parens patriae power and police power.22 
The statute applies to those experiencing “mental illness,”23 though states 
often define this term vaguely.24  New Hampshire, for instance, defines 
“mental illness” as “a substantial impairment of emotional processes, or of 
the ability to exercise conscious control of one’s actions, or of the ability to 
perceive reality or to reason, when the impairment is manifested by instances 
of extremely abnormal behavior or extremely faulty perceptions.”25   
Mental illness alone, without an additional finding of dangerousness, “is 
insufficient to involuntarily admit any person into the mental health services 
system.”26  Under New Hampshire statutory law, a person is a “danger to 
himself” when, within the previous forty days, he has attempted, inflicted, or 
threatened to inflict “serious bodily injury on himself,” and “there is a 
likelihood the act or attempted act will recur if admission is not ordered.”27  
                                                
20 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27. 
21 Robert M. Levy & Leonard S. Rubenstein, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITIES 29 (1996); PARRY, supra note 8, at 471; PERLIN, supra note 12 § 2A-1. 
22 BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 42 (2005) (“The avoidance of danger to self 
constitutes an expression of the state’s parens patriae power to protect the individual’s well 
being. The avoidance of danger to others constitutes an expression of the state’s police power 
interest in protecting the community from harm.”); see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
573–74 (1975) (noting that most state laws for involuntary commitment are generally 
advanced “to prevent injury to the public, to ensure [the committed person’s] own survival or 
safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness”); Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15 
(“[I]nvoluntary institutionalization creates a conflict between the individual’s right to liberty 
and government’s twin powers to shield vulnerable citizens from harm and to protect society 
from danger.”). 
23 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 135-C:27. 
24 WINICK, supra note 22, at 48. 
25 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2. 
26 Id. § 135-C:1; In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1199 (N.H. 2006) (interpreting the stated policy of 
New Hampshire’s statutory scheme for involuntary commitment to mean that that state cannot 
“order an involuntary admission based solely on the existence of a mental illness”). 
27 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27(I)(a)–(b); In re B.T., 891 A.2d. at 1198.  The statute 
provides other possible criteria for finding a danger to self.  Id. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-
C:27(I)(c) (“The person’s behavior demonstrates that he so lacks the capacity to care for his 
own welfare that there is a likelihood of death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation if 
admission is not ordered.”); id. at § 135-C:27(I)(d) (providing an alternative test for finding 
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A person is a “danger to others” when, within the previous forty days, he has 
“inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on 
another.”28   
 
2. Case Law Governing Involuntary Commitment 
 
The involuntary commitment statute comports with the state’s legitimate 
interests in “providing care to its citizens who are unable because of 
emotional disorders to care for themselves” and “protect[ing] the community 
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”29  However, 
the state’s power to achieve these interests is tempered by the individual’s 
liberty interests.30  In particular, “[f]reedom from bodily restraint” is “at the 
core of the liberty protected by the due process clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.”31  The risk of harm to an involuntarily committed 
individual is “significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.”32  
Accordingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has interpreted the 
involuntary commitment statute to contain safeguards for individual rights.33  
“The liberty of the patient is to be curtailed only to the extent necessary to 
protect her and the public,” and a standard of clear and convincing evidence 
applies at civil commitment proceedings to protect the personal interests at 
stake.34 
Dangerousness is a legal concept rather than a medical one; “it is the 
judge who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist.”35  A petition for civil 
commitment must “allege specific acts or action demonstrating 
dangerousness,” and while a psychiatrist’s report is “a crucial piece of 
                                                                                                               
that a person is a “danger to himself,” requiring, among conditions, that he is severely 
mentally disabled, has been involuntarily committed in the past, has no guardian, refuses 
treatment, and an approved psychiatrist for a mental health program determines, based on the 
patient’s history, that “there is a substantial probability that the person’s refusal to accept 
necessary treatment will lead to death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation if 
admission is not ordered”). 
28 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:27(II). 
29 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
30 See Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15 (contending that the “massive curtailment of 
liberty” that occurs during involuntary commitment can infringe upon “the right to liberty, to 
freedom of association, to travel, to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and to 
bodily autonomy”). 
31 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
32 Addington, 441 U.S. at 427. 
33 In re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 577–76 (N.H. 2001). 
34 In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193, 1198 (N.H. 2006); Dolcino v. Clifford, 321 A.2d 577, 578 (N.H. 
1974). 
35 State v. Hudson, 409 A.2d 1349, 1351 (N.H. 1979). 




evidence,” it is not dispositive at a commitment hearing.36  On their own, 
signs of “agitation, delusion, disorganized thinking, and paranoia” do not 
satisfy the specific acts requirement for proving a danger to self or others.37   
The purpose of commitment is treatment, not punishment.38  Once a 
patient is rehabilitated, the state no longer may confine him.39  The United 
States Supreme Court held in O’Connor v. Donaldson that under the due 
process clause, a patient must be released if he no longer is both mentally ill 
and a danger to himself or others.40 
Although most states provide by statute the right to treatment for those 
involuntarily committed, there is “virtually no case law on the question of a 
state constitutional right to treatment.”41 
 
B. Procedure for Involuntary Commitment 
 
The procedure for involuntary commitment in New Hampshire often 
begins at an emergency room when a “petitioner,” such as a police officer or 
relative, brings a person to the hospital after witnessing him exhibit signs of 
mental illness and dangerousness.42  A police officer may place the person 
under protective custody for up to six hours while awaiting examination.43   
The petitioner completes a written petition for examination and 
commitment.44  Once the petitioner completes his form, the patient begins 
what could be a long wait.45  A qualifying physician or advanced practice 
registered nurse (“APRN”) must examine the patient within three days and, if 
warranted, complete a certificate recommending commitment.46   
If a qualifying physician or APRN completes a certificate recommending 
commitment, a law enforcement official must “take custody of the person” 
                                                
36 In re Fasi, 567 A.2d 178, 181 (N.H. 1989). 
37 In re B.T., 891 A.2d at 1199. 
38 In re Richard A., 771 A.2d at 578. 
39 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:33(I). 
40 422 U.S. 563 at 575–76 (1975). 
41 PERLIN, supra note 9, at § 3A-13. 
42 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:28(I) (defining “petitioner” as “any individual, including a 
physician or APRN completing a certificate, who has requested that a physician or APRN 
conduct or who has conducted an examination for purposes of involuntary emergency 
admission”). 
43 Id. § 135-C:28(III). 
44 Id. § 135-C:28(I). 
45 See McDermott, supra note 5. 
46 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:28(I). 
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and “immediately deliver him” to a “designated receiving facility.”47  The 
“designated receiving facility” is a “treatment facility” approved by the state 
“to accept for care, custody, and treatment persons involuntarily admitted to 
the state mental health services system.”48  About half of New Hampshire’s 
inpatient beds for committed patients are located in the state capital, 
Concord.49  Many patients must travel there from rural areas, and if they 
resist, police may transport them in handcuffs.50 
Upon arrival, the facility must notify the patient of a right to legal 
counsel, including a right to appointed counsel if the patient is indigent.51  
Within three days of an “involuntary emergency admission” at the receiving 
facility, the patient is entitled to a hearing in district court to determine if 
probable cause existed for admission.52 
If the court finds that probable cause exists for the emergency admission, 
the admission must not exceed ten days unless a subsequent petition is 
filed.53  The statute does not, however, make provisions for the protection of 
patients who first waited several days in the emergency room because no 
receiving facilities were available.54  The plain language of the statute omits 
any mention of boarding in emergency rooms because this scenario is outside 
what the legislature intended to occur. 
Under the statutory scheme, increased deprivation of liberty corresponds 
to an increase in procedure.55  After a patient spends ten days at a receiving 
facility under emergency admission, a petitioner can file in probate court for 
longer involuntary admission.56  The order for admission could last up to five 
years.57  However, this admission may occur only after an additional 
psychiatric examination and a hearing at which the person has a right to 
counsel and a right to cross-examine the psychiatrist who filed the relevant 
report.58 
                                                
47 Id. § 135-C:29 
48 Id. § 135-C:2 




51 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:30(I), (II). 
52 The three-day period does not include Sundays and holidays.  Id. §§ 135-C:30(V), 135-
C:31(I). 
53 Id. § 135-C:32. 
54 See id. (contemplating a maximum of ten days of involuntary emergency admission without 
any reference to the possibility of additional detainment in an emergency room); McDermott, 
supra note 5. 
55 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:32, 35, 36, 40. 
56 Id. § 135-C:32. 
57 Id. § 135-C:46. 
58 Id. §§ 135-C:40, 43 





II. THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 
 
A. Legal Basis for the Right to Treatment 
 
The state has a duty to provide services and care to those who are 
institutionalized.59  Some patient rights are easily defined; for instance, the 
rights to safe conditions, confidentiality of medical records, and freedom 
from unreasonable seclusion.60  However, the meaning and scope of an 
enforceable “right to treatment” varies by jurisdiction, as the state 
“necessarily has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope 
of its responsibilities.”61  
Under the federal Constitution, substantive due process implies some 
level of treatment, since, at a minimum, the state must show that “the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed.”62  When a person is a danger to himself, 
the purpose of commitment is to ameliorate the danger he poses to himself.63  
Likewise, the purpose of commitment when a person is a danger to others is 
not merely confinement; the purpose is to reduce the risk of danger through 
medical treatment so that he may leave.64  Involuntary commitment that fails 
its purpose by confining a patient but not providing adequate treatment 
would arguably violate due process requirements by arbitrarily depriving a 
person of liberty.65 
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court recognized a limited right to treatment 
and training for those involuntarily committed to a state institution, though 
                                                
59 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (finding it uncontroverted that “[w]hen a 
person is institutionalized [and] wholly dependent on the State . . . a duty to provide certain 
services and care does exist”). 
60 E.g. id. at 315–16, 318 (asserting a “right to security” and “freedom from restraint” inherent 
in substantive due process for those involuntarily committed); WINICK, supra note 22, at 197. 
61 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317; Levy & Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 215; WINICK, supra note 
22, at 197. 
62 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); WINICK, supra note 22, at 199. 
63 See WINICK, supra note 22, at 199 (stating that “[t]he purpose of civil commitment based on 
the government’s parens patriae power is to promote the best interests of individuals who, by 
reason of their mental illness,” are not well-situated “to make decisions on their own behalf.”). 
64 Id. at 200. 
65 Id. at 200–01; see THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 45 (Richard J. Bonnie and 
Lynda Frost eds., 2001) (describing a right to services that arguably arises “whenever the state 
deprives a person of liberty or otherwise takes custodial control”). 
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only as necessary “to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”66  
Beyond this constitutional right to treatment, many state legislatures have 
enacted broader and better-defined rights to treatment.67  The consensus, 
however, is that the right to treatment generally entails a humane 
environment, adequate staffing, and individualized treatment plans.68 
New Hampshire law provides such a right.69  After defining criteria for 
involuntary commitment, the relevant statute lists the rights of those 
receiving mental health services.70  These include the right to an individual 
service plan and “[t]reatment in the least restrictive environment necessary to 
achieve the purposes of the treatment.”71  The patient “has a right to adequate 
and humane treatment provided in accordance with generally accepted 
clinical and professional standards.”72  The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
has held that the statutory right to treatment conveys more than a general 
goal by the legislature; it protects the “civil rights of the mentally disabled 
who are confined in State institutions.”73  
In addition to protecting a patient’s liberty interests, the involuntary 
commitment statute also implies a concern for the patient’s ability to function 
at his probable cause hearing.74  In the forty-eight hours before the hearing, 
the hospital cannot administer medication that would adversely affect the 
patient’s judgment or “limit his ability to prepare for the hearing.”75 
New Hampshire courts may enforce the state’s statutory right to 
treatment.76  Since violation of the right requires a remedy, the state 
impliedly has waived sovereign immunity in claims alleging violation of the 
right to treatment.77 
 
B. The Related Right to Community-Based Services 
 
                                                
66 457 U.S. at 319; PARRY, supra note 8, at 452; see PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-9.8 
(discussing the limited reach of the right to treatment articulated thus far by the Supreme 
Court). 
67 PARRY, supra note 8, at 452; WINICK, supra note 22, at 201; see PERLIN, supra note 9,  § 
3A-14.2 (writing that states responded to the lack of a clearer Supreme Court mandate for 
treatment by implementing their own statutory rights to treatment).  
68 PARRY, supra note 8, at 471. 
69 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57. 
70 Id. § 135-C:55–60. 
71 Id. § 135-C:57. 
72 Id. § 135-C:13. 
73 Chasse v. Banas, 399 A.2d 608, 610 (N.H. 1979). 
74 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31(IV). 
75 Id. 
76 Chasse, 399 A.2d at 610. 
77 Id. 




When the state commits a person involuntarily, it must provide treatment 
in the least restrictive setting possible.  In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,78 
the Supreme Court held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) prohibits the unjustified segregation of individuals with disabilities, 
and it set forth certain requirements for states to provide community-based 
services rather than relying exclusively on more restrictive forms of 
treatment like institutionalization.79  
New Hampshire faced a complaint under this interpretation of the ADA 
in Amanda D. v. Hassan (2012). 80  The state was sued by a class of plaintiffs 
who had serious mental illnesses and who were unnecessarily 
institutionalized, or at serious risk of unnecessary institutionalization, in 
state-run facilities.81  In 2014, New Hampshire entered a class action 
settlement agreement in which it agreed to provide a more effective mental 
health system with significantly enhanced and expanded community-based 
services.82  The promised services included mobile crisis teams, Assertive 
Community Treatment teams,83 supported housing, employment services, 
and family and peer support.84  Thus, under both federal ADA mandates and 
New Hampshire’s involuntary commitment statute, New Hampshire patients 
are entitled to these less restrictive forms of treatment—such as community-
based services—whenever possible.85  
 
III. PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
A. Definition of “Psychiatric Boarding” 
 
                                                
78 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
79 Id. at 607; PARRY, supra note 8, at 453–54; see also 90 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2014). 
80 Amanda D. v. Hassan, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-53-SM (D.N.H. 2012). 
81 Id. 
82 Class Action Settlement Agreement, Amanda D. v. Hassan, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-53-SM 
(D.N.H. 2012), http://www.drcnh.org/mentalhealthcrisis.html [hereinafter Settlement]. 
83 Assertive Community Treatment teams are designed to provide “comprehensive, intensive, 
and flexible treatment, services, and supports to individuals with mental illness, when and 
where they need them.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the New Hampshire Mental 
Health System Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 21–22 (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/new_hampshire_findings.pdf.  They “combine 
treatment, rehabilitation, and support services from professionals in a variety of disciplines, 
including but not limited to, psychiatry, nursing, substance abuse, and vocational 
rehabilitation.”  Id. at 22. 
84 Id. 
85 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57. 
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“Psychiatric boarding” occurs when a patient is held in an emergency 
room because no inpatient beds are available for treatment.86  Boarding 
persists until inpatient beds become available or, if permitted, the patient 
leaves without treatment, and this wait can last twenty-four hours or even 
days.87 
Although at common law doctors did not have a duty to treat potential 
patients, federal law requires hospitals to provide treatment in emergency 
rooms, regardless of ability to pay, pursuant to the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act, among other measures.88  Thus, an emergency 
room must attempt to treat and stabilize a person brought to the facility for 
evaluation and commitment.89  But the emergency room can only accomplish 
so much, and once a doctor or APRN determine that the patient should go to 
a facility specializing in psychiatric care, such facilities often are 
unavailable.90  The patient is then “boarded” in the emergency room.91 
 
B. Prevalence of Psychiatric Boarding 
 
A 2008 national study found that seventy-nine percent of emergency 
departments reported the occurrence of psychiatric boarding at their 
facilities, and ninety percent of those facilities boarded patients every week.92  
According to another study, psychiatric patients are almost five times more 
likely to be boarded than non-psychiatric patients.93 
Nationally, a patient subjected to psychiatric boarding will wait an 
average of 2.8 hours longer for appropriate care than a non-psychiatric 
patient; however, the figure is much higher in the Northeast.94  In New 
Hampshire, a 2013 report found that over half of all patients recommended 
                                                
86 Bender et al., supra note 7; Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in 
America's Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1369 
(2005) (defining “boarding” as “the phenomenon of persons with mental disorders remaining 
in hospital emergency rooms while waiting for mental health services to become available”); 




87 Bender et al., supra note 7. 
88 David Chorney, A Mental Health System in Crisis and Innovative Laws to Assuage the 
Problem, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 215, 223 (2014). 
89 Mary A. Blegen et al., Psychiatric Boarding Incidence, Duration, and Associated Factors in 
United States Emergency Departments, 41 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 57, 62 (Jan. 2015). 
90 See id. at 62–63. 
91 Id. at 63; Chorney, supra note 88, at 216–18. 
92 ACEP Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Survey 2008, supra note 86. 
93 Blegen et al., supra note 89, at 62. 
94 Id. at 63. 




for involuntary emergency admission for mental health treatment waited for 
twenty-four hours or longer.95  For those who waited over twenty-four hours, 
the average wait was two-and-a-half days, and the longest wait was seven 
days.96  A subsequent New Hampshire study found that an average of 
twenty-one adults and five children were waiting for involuntary emergency 
admission each day during a four-month period.97 
 
C. Detrimental Effects of Psychiatric Boarding 
 
Patients waiting in the emergency room do not receive needed therapies 
to improve their mental conditions.98  Instead, they are subjected to the 
typical commotion of an emergency room: “flashing lights, buzzing alarms 
and staff rushing from room to room.”99  What little care they do receive is 
substandard compared to the specialized treatment they would receive at a 
designated receiving facility, and the delays can exacerbate dangerous 
conditions.100  Psychiatric boarding is associated with emergency room 
overcrowding, which correlates with increased mortality, morbidity, longer 
inpatient stays, and decreased patient satisfaction.101 
Boarding also is expensive for all parties involved.102  In 2012, a South 
Carolina emergency room boarded a psychiatric patient for 38 days, at an 
added cost of $56,392 for the hospital.103 Massachusetts implemented a 
                                                
95 Shawn V. LaFrance & Daniel J. Walsh, supra note 1. 
96 Id. 
97 Shawn LaFrance, Waiting for Help: Barriers to Timely Access for People with Mental 
Health Needs 3, FOUND. FOR HEALTHY COMMUNITIES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.healthynh.com/images/PDFfiles/BehavioralHealth/JOHN%20Final%20Summary
%20Report%2004%2030%2014%20FINAL%20Waiting%20for%20Help.pdf. 
98 Blegen et al., supra note 89, at 57. 
99 ACEP Psychiatric And Substance Abuse Survey 2008, supra note 86; Sarah Palermo, 
Mental Health Care Providers Seek More Support From the State A=as Wait List for Help 
Grows, CONCORD MONITOR (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.concordmonitor.com/community/town-
by-town/concord/3721861-95/mental-health-state-hospital. 
100 Blegen et al., supra note 89, at 57.; see Stephanie Armour, South Carolina Psychiatric 
Patient Stuck 38 Days in ER, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 18, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-18/south-carolina-psychiatric-patient-
stuck-38-days-in-er (recounting the story of a psychiatric patient who was locked in a room to 
protect her from another patient while boarding at the emergency department). 
101 Blegen et al., supra note 89, at 57. 
102 Alissa Katz, Billions Fail to Make Dent in ED Boarding of Psych Patients, 36 EMERGENCY 
MED. NEWS 24, 25 (Nov. 2014). 
103 Armour, supra note 100. 
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Behavioral Health Task Force in 2012, and it found that psychiatric boarding 
drove increased health care costs for the commonwealth government.104  
Moreover, while the hospital boards psychiatric patients, emergency room 
staff and resources are diverted from non-psychiatric patients who require 
emergency medical services.105 
 
D. Psychiatric Boarding and Substantive Due Process 
 
The amount of time that involuntarily committed patients may be held 
before a probable cause hearing is a highly litigated issue.106  Psychiatric 
boarding is a closely related issue because it lengthens the overall time of 
involuntary confinement. 
New Hampshire’s statutory scheme does not explicitly mention the 
added time a patient might wait in an emergency room before a probable 
cause hearing.107  When a petitioner brings a person to the emergency room 
for involuntary commitment, and the person is then subjected to several days 
of psychiatric boarding, his detainment is arguably a violation of his due 
process rights.108 
To bring such a claim under § 1983, however, a plaintiff would need to 
identify a state actor.109  The hurdle is high.110  In 2005, the First Circuit 
reviewed a case in which an involuntarily committed patient sued private 
healthcare providers under § 1983.111  The court applied three tests—the state 
compulsion test, the nexus/joint action test, and the public function test—and 
under each analysis, the court held that the private healthcare providers were 
                                                
104 Chorney, supra note 88, at 231. 
105 Katz, supra note 102, at 25. 
106 PARRY, supra note 8, at 472. 
107 The statute requires a probable cause hearing after three days of confinement, but the three-
day countdown does not begin until the patient arrives at a receiving facility.  N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 135-C:31. 
108 See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 8–9, In re the Detention of D.W., 120 Wash.App. 1043 
(2014) (No. 45111-5-II), 2014 WL 4657352, at *7 (arguing that psychiatric boarding violates 
substantive due process because patients have no real opportunity for improvement). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 922, 937 (1982) (requiring 
that “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to 
the State”); Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“a plaintiff claiming a § 1983 violation must allege that a person or persons acting under 
color of state law deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right”). 
110 See, e.g., Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Only in rare 
circumstances can a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.”). 
111 Estades-Negroni, 412 F.3d at 1–2. 




not state actors.112  It therefore affirmed dismissal of the patient’s § 1983 
claim.113 
The New Hampshire District Court likewise raised the state-actor hurdle 
in Trimble v. Androscoggin Valley Hospital, Inc.,114 where the court rejected 
a due process claim brought on behalf of an involuntarily committed patient 
who killed himself in the hospital.115  The court declined to follow116 its prior 
decision in Kay v. Benson,117 where the plaintiff brought a due process claim 
against a physician who signed a certificate for his involuntary 
commitment.118  The court in Kay denied the physician’s summary judgment 
motion because the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that the 
physician “was clothed with state authority so substantial in nature as to 
render his actions virtually identical to actions traditionally taken by a 
state.”119  However, the court in Trimble found that in the intervening fifteen 
years, other courts “reached emphatically different conclusions” than in 
Kay.120  The clear trend was that “[a] private physician or private hospital 
should not become a state actor for” § 1983 liability when acting under the 
state’s involuntary commitment law.121  In light of this trend, the district 
court declined to follow Kay.122 
Though claimants subjected to psychiatric boarding might still find ways 
to surmount the state-actor hurdle,123 this Note will instead focus on the 
statutory right to treatment as precluding psychiatric boarding. 
                                                
112 Id. at 5–8. 
113 Id. at 9. 
114 847 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.H. 1994). 
115 Id. at 228. 
116 Id. 
117 472 F. Supp. 850 (D.N.H. 1979). 
118 Id. at 851. 
119 Id. 
120 Trimble, 847 F. Supp. at 229. 
121 Id. at 229. 
122 Id. at 229–30. 
123 In Kay, the court rejected due process claims against the medical center and its 
rehabilitation counselor.  472 F. Supp. at 851.  However, other actors remain untested.  For 
instance, if a provider at a community mental health center—under contract with the state—
brings a patient to the emergency room, petitions for commitment, and the patient is then 
boarded for several days, could the patient bring a due process claim against the community 
mental health center as a state actor?  See COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS, N.H. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/dcbcs/bbh/centers.htm (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2015) (describing the state’s Community Mental Health Centers as “private” 
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IV. PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING AS A STATUTORY VIOLATION OF THE 
RIGHT TO TREATMENT 
 
While a § 1983 claim would face the hurdles described above, a state 
statutory claim—grounded in a patient’s right to treatment—could provide 
stronger footing for a challenge to psychiatric boarding.124 
Could a statutory right to treatment bar psychiatric boarding?  In 2014, 
the Washington Supreme Court found such a prohibition.125  In a 
groundbreaking opinion, the court held that psychiatric boarding violated a 
patient’s statutory right to treatment when used merely to avoid 
overcrowding at certified facilities.126 
The following analysis shows similarities between New Hampshire’s 
statutory framework for the commitment and treatment of mentally ill 
persons and the Washington statutes that invalidated psychiatric boarding.  
An analogous interpretation of New Hampshire’s statutory right to treatment 
militates against the continued use of psychiatric boarding. 
 
A. Washington State’s Mental Health Statute Is Similar to New 
Hampshire’s 
 
Washington State’s statutory scheme for involuntary commitment 
closely resembles the statutory scheme in New Hampshire. 
Both states declare treatment as a purpose of the laws.127  In Washington, 
commitment serves to “provide prompt evaluation and timely and 
appropriate treatment of persons with serious mental disorders,” as well as 
“continuity of care” for such persons.128  In New Hampshire, the state’s 
purposes include providing “adequate and humane care” to those with severe 
mental disability; coordinating “a comprehensive, effective, and efficient 
system of services for persons with mental illness”; and reducing “the 
                                                                                                               
and “not-for-profit agencies that have contracted with the [state health department] to provide 
publicly funded mental health services to individuals and families”). 
124 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (2015); see Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health 
Servs., 332 P.3d 423, 428 (Wash. 2014) (holding that the state’s right-to-treatment law did not 
permit psychiatric boarding as a means to avoid overcrowding). 
125 See Anne Scheck, Psychiatric Boarding Banned in Washington State: Now What? 
EMERGENCY MED, NEWS 20, 21 (Nov. 2014) (discussing the groundbreaking ruling in 
Washington State and its implications for healthcare providers and state health departments). 
126 Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 428. 
127 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1 (1995) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
71.05.010 (West 1998). 
128 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010(2), (4) (West 1995). 




occurrence, severity and duration of mental, emotional, and behavioral 
disabilities.”129 
Rehabilitation is a chief concern.  Washington endeavors to prevent 
indefinite commitment, while New Hampshire calls for care to be “[d]irected 
toward eliminating the need for services and promoting the person’s 
independence.”130 
Another goal of the Washington framework is to “encourage, whenever 
appropriate, that services be provided within the community.”131  Similarly, 
New Hampshire strives to provide care “[w]ithin each person’s own 
community” and in a manner that is “[l]east restrictive of the person’s 
freedom of movement and ability to function normally in society.”132 
The two states’ criteria for involuntary commitment closely mirror each 
other.  A person with mental illness is eligible for involuntary emergency 
admission if he is a danger to himself or others.133  The state cannot confine 
the person just anywhere; Washington requires treatment in an “evaluation 
and treatment facility,” while New Hampshire requires treatment in an 
analogous “receiving facility.”134  
Both states require a qualified medical professional to examine the 
patient upon his arrival at a psychiatric facility, and the professional must 
complete a “certificate” or “petition” showing that the patient met the 
statutory criteria for involuntary commitment.135  The patient is then entitled 
to a probable cause hearing within three days.136 
After the hearing, a patient in Washington may be detained for up to 
fourteen additional days of involuntary, intensive treatment, and in order to 
                                                
129 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1(I), (II) (1995). 
130 Id. § 135-C:1(II); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010(1) (West 1998). 
131 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010(1) (West 1998). 
132 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1(II) (1995). 
133 Id. § 135-C:27 (1987); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.153(1) (West 1998) (allowing a 
mental health professional to take a person into custody for evaluation and treatment if, “as the 
result of a mental disorder,” he “presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm”). 
134 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:2(XIV) (1995) (requiring treatment facilities to be 
designated for treatment by the health department) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.05.020(16) (West 1998) (requiring facilities providing mental health services to be 
certified by the health department). 
135 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:28(I) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.160(1) (West 
1998). 
136 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31(I) (1995) (setting a deadline of three days for the 
probable cause hearing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.180 (West 1998) (setting a deadline 
of seventy-two hours for the probable cause hearing). 
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detain a person after fourteen days, further judicial process is required.137  A 
patient in New Hampshire may be detained for ten days before further 
commitment proceedings are required.138 
The states impose an additional limit on the time of detainment.  In 
Washington, the facility may release a patient if he “no longer presents a 
likelihood of serious harm.”139  In New Hampshire, the facility “shall 
discharge the person” if he no longer satisfies the statutory criteria.140 
Finally, the states give substance to their stated policy goals by 
enumerating rights to treatment.  Washington law provides: “Each person 
involuntarily detained or committed pursuant to this chapter shall have the 
right to adequate care and individualized treatment.”141  New Hampshire law 
provides: “Each client has a right to adequate and humane treatment provided 
in accordance with generally accepted clinical and professional standards.”142  
New Hampshire patients also have a right to an “individual service plan” and 
“[t]reatment in the least restrictive environment necessary to achieve the 
purposes of the treatment.”143 
 
B. Violation of the Statutory Right to Treatment in Washington State 
 
The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the state’s commitment and 
treatment statutes to bar psychiatric boarding in Detention of D.W.144  The 
case arose from a common problem: a county lacked space in its certified 
facilities for involuntarily detained patients, so instead, the county held them 
in emergency rooms.145  The county argued that a regulation sanctioned 
psychiatric boarding.146  It construed this regulation to allow “single bed 
certification” at uncertified facilities (emergency rooms) when no certified 
facilities were available.147 
Ten patients challenged the legality of this practice.148  The county had 
held the patients in emergency rooms or acute care clinics using single-bed 
certification.149  The patients waited for three to ten days,150 yet when no 
                                                
137 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.230, 71.05.310 (West 1998). 
138 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:32 (2010). 
139 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.230, 71.05.330 (West 1998). 
140 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:33(I) (2002). 
141 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.230, 71.05.360(2) (West 1997). 
142 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:13 (1995). 
143 Id. § 135-C:57(I), (IV) (1995). 
144 Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 332 P.3d 423, 428 (Wash. 2014). 
145 Id. at 424. 
146 Id.; WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-865-0526 (2004). 
147 WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-865-0526 (2004). 
148 Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 424. 
149 Id. at 424–25. 




rooms opened up, the county petitioned to hold the patients longer.151  The 
patients moved to dismiss the petitions because they were not held in 
certified facilities, and thus did not receive adequate treatment while 
confined.152 
One of the county’s mental health supervisors testified at an evidentiary 
hearing that the county obtained single-bed certification simply by faxing a 
form to the state hospital, which, according to the supervisor, almost always 
approved the certifications without asking questions.153  He also testified that 
patients held under such circumstances received “less care than they would if 
they were in an evaluation and treatment center,” and the emergency room 
was “actually a more restrictive environment.”154 
The commissioner dismissed the county’s petitions, and after the county 
appealed, the patients’ claims eventually reached the Washington Supreme 
Court.155  Two hospital systems intervened on the county’s side, along with 
the state Department of Social and Health Services.156  Appellants argued 
that the state’s involuntary commitment law and its implementing regulation 
permitted single-bed certification as a solution to overcrowding at certified 
facilities.157 
The court strictly construed the statute because it impacted liberty 
interests.158  In reaching its decision, the court relied on Washington’s 
statutory provision for “the right to adequate care and individualized 
treatment,” as well as the mandate that patients “be held in certified 
evaluation and treatment facilities.”159  Individuals have a right to treatment 
under Ninth Circuit precedent, and lack of funds cannot justify the state’s 
failure to treat the patient.160 
The court noted that Washington’s statutory definition of “certified 
evaluation and treatment facilities” did not include emergency rooms or 
acute care centers, and such facilities could be used only if they were 
                                                                                                               
150 Brief of Respondents at 1, In re Detention of D.W. (2014) (No. 45111-5-II), 2014 WL 
4657352, at *vii. 
151 Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 424. 
152 Id. at 424–25. 
153 Id. at 425. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 425–26. 
157 Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 427. 
158 Id. at 426. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 426 (citing Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778–79 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
216 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW  Vol. 14, No. 1	  
specifically designated as “evaluation and treatment centers” by the 
Department of Social and Health Services.161  The parties in Detention of 
D.W. did not contend that emergency rooms were so designated.162 
The court ruled that the patients were entitled to adequate treatment at 
certified facilities, and the only permissible reason for not using a certified 
facility would be to further the overarching goal of the statute: providing 
adequate treatment.163  If, for instance, a doctor cited a medical reason for 
keeping a patient in the emergency room—“such as dialysis or chemical 
dependency treatment”—then single-bed certification might be 
appropriate.164  The regulation permitting single-bed certification only went 
this far.165   
Washington did not use psychiatric boarding to further treatment; it used 
psychiatric boarding to cope with lack of resources.166  Therefore, the court 
held that the state violated the patients’ rights when it relied on psychiatric 
boarding to avoid overcrowding at certified facilities.167 
 
C. Could a Similar Case Arise in New Hampshire? 
 
Although plaintiffs have generally had mixed results in bringing claims 
under state right-to-treatment laws,168 Detention of D.W. could encourage 
similar claims in other states.  Under the Washington ruling, a patient’s rights 
do not change simply because a certified facility is unavailable.  A New 
Hampshire court could likely reach the same result using a similar rationale. 
 
1. The Basis for a Similar Case in New Hampshire 
 
As described above, New Hampshire and Washington have similar 
statutory frameworks for involuntary commitment.169  Both states declare 
                                                
161 Id. at 427. 
162 Id.  In contrast to emergency rooms, certified receiving facilities are approved by the state 
for specialized, psychiatric care.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(16) (West 1998). 
163 See Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 427 (grounding the court’s decision in the statutory right to 
adequate treatment and permitting deviation from the use of certified treatment facilities only 
“when, in the exercise of professional judgment, a properly qualified agent of the mental 
health division determines that there is either a medical justification for involuntarily detaining 
a patient outside a certified facility or that the single bed certification would facilitate 
continuity of care”). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 427–28. 
167 Id. at 428.  Response to the ruling is discussed infra in Section V.  
168 PARRY, supra note 8, at 452. 
169 See supra Section IV.  




treatment as their purpose;170 both enumerate a right to treatment;171 both 
contemplate time limits for confinement and mandate judicial process to 
safeguard individual rights;172 and both require treatment in certified 
facilities.173 
Just like the respondents in Detention of D.W., involuntarily committed 
patients in New Hampshire are entitled to treatment at a certified facility and 
in the least restrictive environment necessary.174  The court in Detention of 
D.W. strictly construed the statutory requirement that patients receive 
treatment in certified “evaluation and treatment facilities,” and New 
Hampshire likewise requires treatment in a designated “receiving facility.”175  
Just as the Washington court held that emergency rooms did not meet the 
statutory criteria, similarly, New Hampshire could reach the same result by 
finding that emergency rooms are not designated receiving facilities, and are 
not used to provide better medical treatment, but rather to avoid 
overcrowding.   
The court discussed regulations at length in Detention of D.W., since the 
regulations had expressly permitted single-bed certification.176  New 
Hampshire regulations address psychiatric boarding only indirectly.177  They 
mandate that a receiving facility accept a patient sent to that facility pursuant 
to the involuntary commitment law, “unless there are no beds available at the 
time of admission.”178  What should happen if no beds are available at any of 
the receiving facilities?  The regulations do not say. 
Appellants in Detention of D.W. argued that the Washington regulations 
provided an answer: lacking beds at certified facilities, the state could board 
patients in emergency rooms using “single bed certification.”179  Yet the 
                                                
170 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:1 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010 (West 1995). 
171 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:13 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.230, 
71.05.360(2) (West 1995). 
172 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:32(I) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.230, 
71.05.330 (West 1998). 
173 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:2(XIV), 135-C:26 (1995) (requiring treatment facilities to 
be designated for treatment by the health department); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
71.05.020(16) (West 1998) (requiring facilities providing mental health services to be certified 
by the health department). 
174 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:57 (2002). 
175 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:2(XIV), 135-C:26 (1995). 
176 Det. of D.W. v. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 332 P.3d 423 (Wash. 2014). 
177 See N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. He-M 405.06 (1983) (mentioning the possibility of a receiving 
facility lacking beds but not stating what should happen in such scenarios). 
178 Id. 
179 Det. of D.W., 332 P.3d at 427. 
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court rejected appellants’ interpretation of the regulation, holding that 
overcrowding was no excuse for psychiatric boarding.180  New Hampshire 
does not have an equivalent “single bed certification” regulation, and even if 
it did, a court would likely interpret it as inconsistent with the statutory 
requirement that a patient immediately be transferred to a certified receiving 
facility.181 
New Hampshire regulations also implicate psychiatric boarding when 
discussing the purposes of receiving facilities.  One purpose of a receiving 
facility is to admit involuntarily committed patients “beginning with initial 
custody and continuing through the day following the probable cause 
hearing.”182  This language mandates that patients should go to designated 
receiving facilities as soon as possible from the time of “initial custody.”  For 
involuntarily committed patients waiting in emergency rooms, the time of 
initial custody has already begun.  
Finally, the New Hampshire statute for involuntary commitment states 
that “[u]pon completion” of a certificate for emergency admission, “any law 
enforcement officer shall . . . take custody of the person to be admitted and 
immediately deliver him to the receiving facility identified in the 
certificate.”183  The command to “immediately deliver” the patient to the 
facility gives no leeway for psychiatric boarding. 
 
2. Possible Ambiguities in New Hampshire’s Statutory Right to 
Treatment 
 
While the Washington right to treatment is analogous to New 
Hampshire’s, claimants in a first impression case will encounter some 
differences and ambiguities in the laws.  These variations in language should 
not lead to a different holding. 
When interpreting statutes, New Hampshire courts “examine the 
language found in the statute, and where possible, [they] ascribe the plain 
and ordinary meanings to words used.”184  The court will “interpret 
legislative intent from the statute as written and will neither consider what 
the legislature might have said nor add language it did not see fit to 
include.”185  “When the language used in the statute is clear and 
                                                
180 Id. at 428. 
181 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:29(I) (1998) (“Upon completion of an involuntary 
emergency admission certificate under RSA 135-C:28, any law enforcement officer 
shall . . . take custody of the person to be admitted and immediately deliver him to the 
receiving facility identified in the certificate.”). 
182 N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. He-M 612.03 (1986). 
183 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:29 (1995) (emphasis added). 
184 In re Sandra H., 846 A.2d 513, 520 (N.H. 2004). 
185 State v. Paul, 104 A.3d 1058, 1060 (N.H. 2014). 




unambiguous,” the court will not modify its meaning by judicial 
construction.186 
The legislature’s policy objectives are relevant to interpretation of 
ambiguous provisions.  The court will “interpret a statute in the context of 
the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation.”187  Its goal is to apply 
statutes “in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them” and “in light of 
the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.”188 
The language in New Hampshire’s statutory right to treatment contains 
ambiguities, discussed infra in this section, and a reviewing court will thus 
look beyond the language to the legislature’s policy goals in determining 
legislative intent.  Here, the legislature’s stated purpose in its mental health 
system laws is to: 
 
(a) Establish, maintain, and coordinate a comprehensive, 
effective, and efficient system of services for persons with 
mental illness. 
 
(b) Reduce the occurrence, severity and duration of 
mental, emotional, and behavioral disabilities. 
 
(c) Prevent mentally ill persons from harming 
themselves or others.189 
 
The legislature’s stated policy is to provide “adequate and humane care” 
that is: 
 
(a) Within each person’s own community. 
 
(b) Least restrictive of the person’s freedom of 
movement and ability to function normally in society while 
being appropriate to the person’s individual capacity. 
 
(c) Directed toward eliminating the need for services and 
promoting the person’s independence.190 
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Thus, the stated purpose and policy weigh toward broad application of 
treatment rights when interpreting the statutes for involuntary emergency 
admission. 
Under § 135-C:57, individuals have a right to “[t]reatment in the least 
restrictive environment necessary to achieve the purposes of the 
treatment.”191  § 135-C:55 restricts the application of this right, along with 
other patients’ rights, “to those persons who have been found eligible for 
services under RSA 135-C:13 and to those persons who have been admitted 
to receiving facilities.”192  The right to treatment, as enunciated in § 135-
C:57, would thus apply only to: (1) those eligible for services under § 135-
C:13, and (2) those admitted to receiving facilities.  These two groups raise 
questions of interpretation. 
First, when has a person “been found eligible for services under RSA 
135-C:13,” such that the statutory right to treatment in § 135-C:57 applies?  § 
135-C:13 prohibits discrimination in provision of services, stating: “Every 
severely mentally disabled person shall be eligible for admission to the state 
mental health services system, and no such person shall be denied services 
because of race, color or religion, sex, or inability to pay.”193  This section 
appears to address those seeking services voluntarily more than it does those 
forced to receive services involuntarily. 
Nonetheless, § 135-C:13 could arguably encompass those held for 
involuntary, emergency commitment.  It states that individuals found to be 
“severely mentally disabled” are eligible for state mental health services.  A 
separate provision defines “severely mentally disabled” to mean “having a 
mental illness which is either so acute or of such duration as to cause a 
substantial impairment of a person’s ability to care for himself or to function 
normally in society.”194  This definition would likely cover those who, as a 
result of mental illness, are a danger to themselves or others.  Considered 
alongside the broader definition, legislative intent to provide treatment, as 
well as the constitutional requirement to provide treatment when liberty is 
deprived for that purpose, § 135-C:13 is properly read to include patients 
who are in custody and boarded in emergency rooms. 
The second group of patients within the scope of § 135-C:55 are those 
“admitted to receiving facilities.”195  Under § 135-C:26, receiving facilities 
are for “the care, custody, and treatment of persons subject to involuntary 
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admissions.”196  Thus, the second question of interpretation: When has a 
patient been “admitted” to receiving facilities?   
If “admitted” means arrival at the receiving facility or assignment to a 
bed, then a patient waiting in the emergency room has not yet been admitted.  
On the other hand, if “admitted” means that a patient is in custody and 
waiting for transport to a particular receiving facility, then a patient subjected 
to psychiatric boarding is “admitted”—just to an overcrowded facility.  This 
reading is more consistent with the statutory scheme, which contemplates 
that a person may be held up to six hours while a petition is filed, and once 
the petition and medical certificate are complete, the person must 
“immediately” be transferred to a designated receiving facility.197 
 § 135-C:28 may provide guidance for interpreting the term “admitted.”  
It states that “involuntary emergency admission . . . may be ordered upon the 
certificate of a physician or APRN.”198  The physician “shall identify in the 
certificate the facility in the state mental health services system to which the 
person shall be admitted.”199  In choosing a facility, he must identify the 
option “which least restrict[s] the client’s freedom of movement, ability to 
make decisions, and participation in his community while achieving the 
purposes of habilitation and treatment.”200  This section suggests that the 
patient is “admitted” to a receiving facility upon completion of the certificate 
by an emergency room doctor, with the overarching “purposes of habilitation 
and treatment” guiding the process throughout the patient’s detention. 
 Extension of the right to treatment to boarded patients is further 
supported by § 135-C:31, which states that a receiving facility may transfer a 
patient to another receiving facility only if the second “receiving facility can 
better provide the degree of security and treatment required for the 
person.”201  Again, this provision indicates that the patient’s treatment is the 
foremost concern while he is in custody. 
 In sum, the overall statutory scheme supports a finding that patients 
subjected to psychiatric boarding are entitled to treatment in the least 
restrictive environment necessary.  In light of the legislative intent to provide 
treatment to those with serious mental illness, and the clear mandate to 
provide treatment to those whose liberty is curtailed involuntarily, courts 
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should resolve the statutory ambiguities in a way that supports treatment of 
individuals subjected to psychiatric boarding. 
 
V. EFFECTIVE RESPONSE: IMPLEMENT THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN AND 
EXPAND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 
 
The ruling in Detention of D.W. forced Washington officials to consider 
treatment options for boarded patients.202  Such patients previously had been 
in legal limbo, but the court clarified their rights.  The chair of the state house 
appropriations committee responded to the ruling by commenting, “It’s 
always been inhumane not to provide treatment; now it’s clearly illegal.”203 
Health officials struggled with how to respond.  An official at the 
department of social and health services worried that as a result of the ruling, 
more mentally ill patients could end up on the streets without receiving the 
care they needed.204  However, hospitals cannot simply throw patients out 
because of overcrowding; they must comply with federal requirements for 
safe discharges.205  Dr. Alex Rosenau, President of American College of 
Emergency Physicians (“ACEP”), said there was “no doubt” the ruling 
would “help with crowding,” but he wondered: “what is step two?”206 
One way or another, the court required Washington to implement the 
statute as written.  Officials were compelled to make difficult budgetary 
decisions and ensure sufficient resources at certified facilities.207  
New Hampshire too should make the difficult budgetary decisions now 
and implement its statutes as written.  The state’s detailed statutory 
procedures for commitment derive from the serious liberty interests at stake 
and mandate that New Hampshire must provide “[t]reatment in the least 
restrictive environment” consistent with both legislative intent and critical 
constitutional considerations.208 
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A. Community-Based Services Are the Best Starting Point 
 
New Hampshire should continue expanding community-based services 
for those with mental illness.  This will relieve pressure on the state’s 
inpatient facilities and reduce the number of patients requiring emergency 
care.  Community mental health services are more cost- and outcome-
effective than attempting to add beds at long-term facilities.209 
The state already has a good start toward the implementation of a full, 
robust system of community-based services.  In New Hampshire’s class-
action settlement in Amanda D., the state agreed to significantly expand and 
enhance its community-based services, including mobile crisis teams, 
supported housing, Assertive Community Treatment teams,210 and 
employment services.211 
Telehealth programs also could reduce boarding.  The mobile crisis 
services implemented through Amanda D. focus on more populous areas of 
New Hampshire.212  For underserved and rural areas, telehealth could provide 
a partial solution.213 The terms “telehealth” or “telemedicine” broadly 
describe “the use of medical information exchanged from one site to another 
via electronic communications to improve the patient’s health status.”214   
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B. Long-Term Institutionalization Would Not Remedy the Problem 
 
At first glance, increasing the number of beds at long-term facilities may 
seem like a quick fix for psychiatric boarding, and some state officials have 
called for this solution.215  However, this response would not serve patients 
well, since long-term institutionalization is not as effective as community-
based services,216 and if the state over-relies on long-term facilities to provide 
care, it will expose itself to the same liability that led to its settlement in 
Amanda D.217  Instead, the state should focus on enhancing community-based 
services. 
 
1. Long-Term Institutionalization Is Less Effective and Exposes 
the State to Liability 
 
The trend over the past several decades has been to rely less on long-
term institutionalization because it is not as effective as community-based 
services.218  Institutionalization is an extreme measure that entails social costs 
and substantial risks to those committed.219  Furthermore, spending scarce 
resources on facility-based treatment may leave people without necessary 
services in the community, resulting in individuals cycling in and out of 
hospitals without creating long-term stability within the community. 
If for no other reason, New Hampshire should avoid increased reliance 
on long-term institutionalization because the same reliance exposed the state 
to liability under Amanda D.220  The state agreed to provide a greater balance 
of community-based services in its settlement agreement.221  Over-reliance 
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on institutionalization violates the ADA and violates the doctrine of the least 
restrictive alternative.222 
 
2. Long-Term Institutionalization Is Uneconomical 
 
From a state budgetary perspective, adding beds at long-term facilities is 
too costly compared to more economical solutions like increased community-
based services.223  Like many states, New Hampshire faced a budget shortfall 
for fiscal year 2015 with no apparent resources to fund additional mental 
health services.224  Community-based services can cost a fraction of 
institutionalization and may qualify for Medicaid reimbursement.225  In 2010, 
the average cost of treating a person at New Hampshire’s primary long-term 
facility was $287,000 per year, compared to $44,000 per year to treat a 
person in the community.226 
 
C. Treatment Must Precede the Probable Cause Hearing 
 
The trigger for the three-day countdown to a probable cause hearing 
currently begins with the patient’s arrival at a designated receiving facility.227  
The state could arguably cure procedural due process concerns by starting the 
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countdown earlier with the filing of the involuntary emergency admission 
petition, such that patients boarded in the emergency room would receive a 
hearing sooner.  However, this response does not necessarily help such 
individuals because patients do not receive adequate treatment while in the 
emergency room, and as a result, they are less likely to perform well at a 
hearing.228  Moreover, this option does not cure the state’s potential liability 
for violation of the right to treatment, since patients could leave without 




Psychiatric boarding violates patients’ right to treatment by confining 
them in highly restrictive environments that do not provide adequate care and 
that do not meet the statutory criteria for receiving facilities.  Washington’s 
statutory framework for involuntary commitment and its corresponding 
ruling in Detention of D.W. suggest that involuntarily committed patients 
could succeed in a similar claim in New Hampshire.  The state should 
implement the statute as written and continue to expand community-based 
services, thus ensuring that no patients fall between the cracks. 
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